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 Abstract: 
Sovereign debt restructuring refers to debt workout procedures for sovereigns which involve 
reduction in the nominal value of the old debt instruments when the debt burden of a country 
becomes unsustainable. Debt restructuring is required in any debtor-creditor relationship 
since any financial contract has to take the possibility of default into account. As far as 
corporations are concerned, the idea that the debt burden of the corporations may become 
unsustainable and in which case it may require restructuring is not new. Corporations in the 
US have access to legal remedies if they want to restructure their debts or go for liquidation. 
But when it comes to sovereigns, the international financial architecture lacks any mechanism 
to take care of the “debt overhang” of sovereigns. 
Literature in this area has tried to model the incentives which would lead the 
sovereign debtor towards repayment. The two main incentives are direct punishments (such 
as trade embargoes) and reputation concerns (fear of loss of access to international capital 
markets). The basic assumption in all these models is that creditors only have limited powers 
to enforce repayments since the sovereign debtor cannot be ordered to repay by the courts of 
the creditors‟ country of origin because of the sovereign immunity laws. The focus of this 
paper is on the recently concluded Argentine debt restructuring where the sovereign debtor 
was forced to make repayments to the “vulture funds” after an order for repayment was 
passed by the US courts, thus making the assumption of non-enforceability of sovereign debt 
untenable.  This is a real threat because 70% of the sovereign bond documentation is under 
the US law at present and many debt restructuring exercises are on in countries around the 
globe.  
The paper also looks at two different sovereign debt crisis resolution episodes from 
history – the first one is the Barings‟ Crisis of 1890 when Britain was the centre of 
international finance and the other episode is from the inter-war period when USA had 
overtaken Britain. The attempt is to see if history has some lessons to offer for an orderly 
debt workout.  
Keywords: debt overhang, default, sovereign debt restructuring, repayment, vulture funds. 
1.1: Introduction 
Sovereign debt restructuring refers to debt workout procedures for sovereigns which involve 
reduction in the face (nominal) value of the old debt instruments when the debt burden of a 
country becomes unsustainable. A restructuring of debt is done through an exchange of 
outstanding sovereign debt instruments, such as loans or bonds, for new debt instruments or 
cash through a legal process. It is not the same as debt rescheduling which implies 
lengthening of maturities of the old debt. Debt restructuring is required in any debtor-creditor 
relationship since any financial contract has to take the possibility of default into account. If 
banks were to know that all money which they have lent were to come back to them for sure, 
then the whole theory of asymmetric information which is a part of many models of monetary 
economics would become irrelevant. As far as corporations are concerned, the idea that the 
debt burden of the corporations may become unsustainable and in which case they may 
require a restructuring is not new. Corporations in the US do have access to Chapter 11 of the 
US Bankruptcy code if they want to restructure their debts. They can also liquidate their firms 
by taking the aid of Chapter 7 in the same code.  But when it comes to sovereigns, the 
international financial architecture lacks any mechanism to take care of the „debt overhang‟ 
of sovereigns (Krugman, 1988) though the idea of  an international law for governing 
sovereign debt is centuries old :  “When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself 
bankrupt, in the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, 
open and avowed bankruptcy  is always the measure which is both least dishonourable to the 
debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor” (Smith, 1776). 
Early literature in the area tried to model the incentives which would lead the sovereign 
debtor towards repayment (Eaton and Gersowitz, 1981; Eaton, Gersowitz and Stiglitz, 1986). 
The two major mechanisms identified in the literature which would lead sovereign debtors 
towards repayment were direct punishments (such as trade embargoes) and reputational 
concerns (“willingness to pay” defaults could lead to loss of access to international capital 
markets) (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; Eaton and Fernandez, 1995). The basic assumption in 
all these models was that creditors only have limited powers to enforce repayments since 
the sovereign debtor could not be ordered to repay by the courts of the country of origin 
of the creditors because of the sovereign immunity laws. The assumption persists even in 
the recent literature - “The defining feature of sovereign debt is the limited mechanisms for 
enforcement” (Aguiar and Amador, 2013).So, according to the theoretical literature the 
“binding constraint on debt repayments” would be “willingness to pay” of the sovereign 
debtor and not its “ability to pay” (Eaton and Gersowitz, 1981). Sovereign debt crisis 
resolution in developing countries became difficult after some major institutional changes 
which took place in the 1990‟s. Firstly, a process of financial disintermediation was in place 
after the advent of the Brady bonds from the early 1990‟s onwards. So, countries moved 
mostly from bank finance to bond finance as their preferred source. This increased the 
volatility in the emerging markets as the structure of the bonds markets may become 
dispersed (Argentina is a case in point) so much so that it becomes difficult to identify the 
lender. Secondly, from the 1990‟s onwards, the developing countries also saw a surge in 
capital inflows which was unrelated to their current needs of trade and investment. There 
were also changes in the sovereign immunity laws in the US and UK in the late 1970‟s. The 
sovereigns do not enjoy absolute immunity from litigation attempts by their commercial 
creditors in the US as they did earlier in history. Also, the problem of debt restructuring no 
more remained a problem of a debtor-creditor negotiation. It became an inter-creditor 
negotiation issue.    
I have tried to study the Argentine episode at greater length focussing mainly on the judicial 
interpretation of the infamous “pari passu” clause which sounded the death knell for an 
orderly debt workout in Argentina. I shall also look at what economic implications this 
decision has for future restructurings given the fact that the viability of some of the key 
assumptions of the theoretical models is in question now. I would also go back into history to 
see how sovereign debt crises were resolved then and would try to answer the following 
question – Can history guide us towards a “good faith” and orderly debt workout?  I look at 
two different episodes from history under two different hegemonic regimes – the first one is 
the Barings‟ Crisis of 1890 when Britain was the centre of international finance and the other 
episode is from the inter-war period when America had taken over the role of the hegemon 
after the demise of the gold standard era.  
1.2: Argentina’s Attempts at Debt Restructuring 
Argentina resorted to a hard currency peg (a currency board arrangement) in 1991 to solve 
the inflation problem. The currency board arrangement was an extreme form of a fixed 
exchange rate regime wherein the country adopted “an explicit legislative commitment” to fix 
the nominal exchange rate at a certain parity with the US dollar (1 peso = 1 US dollar). The 
Central Bank of the country was permitted to issue the domestic currency only on the 
condition that it was backed by an equivalent purchase of US dollars (Frenkel and Rapetti, 
2010). The name “convertibility” was earned because pesos could be exchanged for dollars 
one-to-one with the backing of the legislature. The idea was that such a hard currency peg 
would reduce the future inflationary expectations of the agents in the economy and would 
make the actions of the government sound more credible. What the convertibility programme 
did in effect was to make the imbalances in the balance of payments adjust through output 
and employment changes rather than through changes in prices. This was because any 
addition to the foreign exchange reserves had to be balanced by an equal expansion of the 
monetary base of the economy and that led to an increase in output and employment. 
Similarly, any contraction of the foreign exchange reserves had to be balanced by an equal 
contraction of the monetary base that led to a reduction in the output and employment in the 
economy (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2010). 
The convertibility programme was able to instil confidence among the market participants 
and the inflationary expectations in the economy went down. This led to a drastic decline in 
the inflation rate in the economy in the 1990s. The country attracted huge inflows of capital 
after the convertibility programme was implemented (Graph 1.1) and this swelled the foreign 
exchange reserves of the country. There were three important reasons for this surge in the 
capital inflows into the country – a decrease in the interest rates in the US in the early 1990s, 
the increase in price stability in the country after the adoption of the convertibility 
programme and the incentives given to the private investors by the large scale deregulation of 
the economy under the convertibility programme. The increase in the capital inflows led to a 
surge in liquidity in the economy. This caused a reduction in the interest rates that led to a 
rise in the aggregate demand and employment in the economy. The expansion of aggregate 
demand led to an increase in the prices of non-tradables that caused a real exchange rate 
appreciation. The real exchange rate might also have appreciated due to the presence of 
inertial inflation. The inertia in inflation arose due to the indexation of wage contracts and the 
indexation of many non-tradables like housing rents, school fees and mortgage payments 
(Frenkel and Rapetti, 2010). These led to the worsening of the current account balance which, 
in turn, increased the need for external financing that further boosted the accumulation of 
debts in the economy in the latter half of the 1990s (Graph 1.2). 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
Source: International Debt Statistics, World Bank. 
The rise in external indebtedness significantly increased the fragility of the economy. This led 
to a weakening of the credibility in the economy‟s management of the exchange rate system. 
The risk premium rose with the increase in the probability of an exchange rate devaluation 
causing a rise in the domestic interest rate. The economy thus became vulnerable to 
speculative attacks against its currency and faced a banking and currency crisis after two 
exogenous shocks in the late 1990s – the Asian and the Russian crisis. The country eventually 
defaulted on its external debt in 2001. The period of “euphoria” had added significantly to the 
debt burden of Argentina and most of that debt was held in the hands of the public sector.  
There was no doubt in the fact that such a large debt burden was unsustainable and sooner or 
later it would require a restructuring. Unfortunately, the restructuring exercise could not take 
place pre-emptively. This debt stock was later restructured in 2005 and 2010 after Argentina 
defaulted on payments that were due to its private foreign creditors. The Kirchner 
government that came to power in 2003 decided to save the resources of the country from 
being wasted on servicing debt and utilise the savings on increased social sector spending. 
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Graph 1.2: External debt stocks (% of GNI) 
External debt stocks (% of
GNI)
Restructuring of debt in Argentina was not a simple exercise due to two important reasons- 
first, because the government had issued 152 bonds denominated in 7 currencies and 
governed by multiple jurisdictions by the time of the default (Thornbeck, 2004) which made 
the negotiation process extremely difficult and second, because the domestic banks in 
Argentina were holding a lot of the government issued bonds as their assets. Any decline in 
the face value of such bonds could destroy the intermediation channels in Argentina. The 
region wise distribution of non-performing debt which was to be restructured in 2005 was as 
follows- 
Graph 1.3: Region Wise Distribution of Non-Performing Debt 
Source: Hornbeck, 2004. 
 The majority of the debt which was to be restructured in 2005 and later on in 2010 was held 
by domestic creditors (Graph 1.3). This consisted of common people of Argentina, the 
pension fund holders and other retail investors who had invested their lives‟ savings in 
buying their country‟s bonds which are considered to be the most risk free asset in any 
country. The next big segment of bondholders consisted of European (majorly Italian) retail 
investors who were again investors with marginal savings. An IMF study puts the number of 
retail investors affected in the 2005 restructuring exercise to be around 6,00,000 -4,50,000 
Italians, 35,000 Japanese and 1,50,000 Germans and Central Europeans (Das, Papaioannou 
and Trebesch, IMF Working Paper,2012).  It is interesting to note here that the major threat 
to this restructuring exercise came eventually from the minority of the bondholders (holdouts 
from the United States). The attempt at restructurings both in 2005 and 2010 were aimed at 
bilaterally negotiating with the private creditors in “good faith” in the hope that there would 
not be any holdouts; but this was not to happen. The details of the restructuring exercise for 
2005 are as follows- 
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Post-default restructuring: 66 US$ and Ar peso denominated bonds exchanged for 5 US$ and 
Ar peso denominated bonds. 
Total Duration: 42 months 
Haircut: 76.8 % 
Participation Rate: 76% (others were holdouts who litigated) 
Creditor Structure: Dispersed 
(Source: Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch, IMF Working Paper, 2012). 
There were many novel features in the debt swap agreement of the 2005 restructuring. The 
debt restructuring which was being done under the Peronist government of Nestor Kirchner 
came down heavily on the practice of capitalizing past due interest and increasing the overall 
debt burden. So, the deal included the provision that Argentina would not recognise the past 
due interest for the period between December 2001 and December 2003 (Sturzenegger and 
Zettelmeyer, 2006). The other interesting part of the deal was that the newly restructured 
bonds were GDP linked which means interest payments on these bonds would be conditional 
on the growth of the economy. The conditions were the following – “GDP had to be higher 
than the stipulated trend; growth in the previous year had to be larger than 3 percent; and the 
total payments made by the facility could never be larger than 48 cents on the dollar” 
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006). The agreement also carried a stick feature – the 
Kirchner government passed a new law – the Ley Cerrojo (The “Lock Law”). This law 
forbade the government from reopening any additional exchanges in the future for the 
bondholders who refuse to abide by the 2005 terms of the exchange. This was also the first 
debt restructuring exercise in Argentina which had made use of the collective action clauses
1
 
(CAC‟s). The use of CAC‟s in the US law was permitted after 2003 when they were used by 
Mexico for the first time. After the restructuring exercise in 2005, the Argentine government 
took another historic step by making the debt renegotiation process completely bilateral – it 
cleared all its IMF dues and made its restructuring deal free from IMF surveillance. The IMF 
program was suspended in August 2004 and full payment was made on IMF dues in 2006.  
The 2010 debt restructuring exercise was an attempt by the Cristina Kirchner government to 
carry forward the process of honouring the sovereign debtor‟s payment commitments which 
                                                          
1
 These are clauses which are added in a debt contract. In the event of a need for a debt restructuring, these 
clauses kick in as follows- If 75 % of the creditors have agreed for a restructuring of the debt burden of the 
sovereign debtor, the minority creditors are also roped in irrespective of their wishes.   
was started in 2005. The Cristina Kirchner government had to repeal the Lock Law which it 
had enacted in 2005 to enable another debt swap in 2010. The main reason behind opening 
another debt swap was that the government wanted to rope in the holdouts to avoid the much 
litigation which had started coming up after 2005 in courts across the globe against 
Argentina. The terms of agreement which were offered in the 2010 debt swap were almost 
same as that in 2005. This was due to a law which the Argentine government had passed in 
2009 – the RUFO clause. The RUFO (Rights upon Future Offers) clause barred the 
government from giving bondholders who had filed lawsuits any favourable treatment than 
what was offered to those who have not done so. This law were to have important 
implications later for Argentina in 2014. The result of the debt swap was encouraging since it 
did rope in some holdouts and the participation rate for both 2005 and 2010 exchange 
combined came out to be 91.3%. The minority creditors who still did not agree to abide by 
the terms of the agreement were majorly hedge funds who had deep pockets and could fight 
cases against what they called the “rogue debtor”. This can be clearly observed from the 
details about the participation in the debt swap as mentioned in the table below –  
Table 1.1: Participation in the 2010 Debt Swap 
 Participants Non-Participants Total 
Main non-litigants 8.6 0.0 8.6 
Italian Retail Investors 3.3 1.0 4.3 
Litigants (Hedge funds) 0.0 4.4 4.4 
Others 0.5 0.6 1.1 
Total 12.4 6.0 18.4 
Source: Hornbeck, 2013. All figures are in US billion $. 
The hedge funds who owned 4.4 billion $ of Argentine bonds were the major non-
participants in the 2010 debt swap. A group of hedge funds in America had formed an 
organisation in the early 2000‟s to advance their interests. This group was known as 
American Task Force Argentina (ATFA). NML, a Cayman-islands based subsidiary of Elliot 
Funds Limited was a major force behind this grouping. Paul Singer owns Elliot Funds and 
using his political clout among the Republicans in the US, the ATFA spent around 6.7 
million US $ in lobbying from 2007 to June 2015 (Source: Embassy of Argentina in the 
United States). All kinds of arm twisting measures have been tried against Argentina by these 
hedge funds throughout the restructuring period and even after that - ranging from seizing 
Argentinian assets in the central bank, capturing a ship on foreign soil and attempting to 
capture the President‟s plane. These actions were eerie reminders to the world of the days of 
„gunboat diplomacy‟. Imperialism reached an unrivalled ferocity after the US court‟s 
eventual decision in favour of the hedge funds on which I shall focus now. 
1.3: The Litigation and the “Pari Passu” Clause 
NML Capital Ltd. was the frontrunner in litigating against Argentina in US courts. The 
example which it set was then followed by other creditors so much so that the debt 
restructuring exercise became what in the literature is called “rush to the courthouse” 
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006). The main plaintiff NML‟s case was heard in the 
United States District Court (Southern District of New York) by Judge Thomas Griesa. Judge 
Griesa gave a series of judgements on matters related to the debt restructuring exercise of 
Argentina but the most remarkable judgement was the one given in November 2012 when 
Judge Griesa very creatively used the “pari passu” clause (which was present in the 
agreement of the bonds issued to the holdout creditors) to aid the plaintiffs. This judgement 
was a landmark judgement which thwarted all the work which had gone into gaining 
international support for a sovereign bankruptcy regime. I shall look into the judicial 
interpretation of this clause in greater detail now. 
“Pari passu” is a Latin phrase which means „equal footing‟. In 1994, the bonds were issued 
by the Fiscal Agency Agreement (FAA) in Argentina with the agreement containing this 
clause. The agreement read as follows – “The Securities will constitute . . . direct, 
unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all 
times rank pari passu and without any preference among themselves. The payment 
obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with all 
its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness . . .” (NML 
Capital,Ltd.v. The Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105 (2d Cir. 2012)) 
The initial ruling by Judge Griesa‟s court was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. The Court of Appeals observed that “ ..the combination of Argentina‟s executive 
declarations and legislative enactments have ensured that plaintiffs‟ beneficial interests do 
not remain direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic 
and that any claims that may arise from the Republic‟s restructured debt do have priority in 
Argentinian courts over claims arising out of the Republic‟s unstructured debt. Thus we have 
little difficulty concluding that Argentina breached the pari passu Clause of the FAA” (NML 
Capital,Ltd.v. The Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105 (2d Cir. 2012)). This ruling certainly 
overlooked the facts of the matter in the case because the restructured bondholders had taken 
deep haircuts to get “priority” over claims compared to other unstructured creditors. There 
was no mention of this fact in the judgement of the Court of Appeals. After getting approval 
from the Court of Appeals regarding the breach of the “pari passu” clause, the task was left 
for Judge Griesa‟s court to decide appropriate punishment for the “rogue debtor” and also to 
explain the terms of payments to the bondholders. Judge Griesa awarded an injunction to the 
Republic of Argentina in the case and ruled that “The Republic accordingly is permanently 
ORDERED to specifically perform its obligations to NML under Paragraph 1(c) of the FAA 
as follows:  
Whenever the Republic pays any amount due under terms of the bonds or other obligations 
issued pursuant to the Republic‟s 2005 or 2010 Exchange Offers, or any subsequent exchange 
of or substitution for the 2005 and 2010 Exchange Offers that may occur in the future 
(collectively, the “Exchange Bonds”), the Republic shall concurrently or in advance make a 
“Ratable Payment” (as defined below) to NML.” (NML Capital, LTD., v. Republic of 
Argentina, United States District Court, Southern District of New York). The court explained 
the idea of “Ratable Payment” as follows – “if 100% of what is currently due to the exchange 
bondholders is paid, then 100% of what is currently due to plaintiffs must also be paid” 
(NML Capital, LTD., v. Republic of Argentina, United States District Court, Southern District 
of New York). 
 Although the breach of the “pari passu” clause does not merit an injunction, Judge Griesa 
had his own reasons for ordering an injunction. As he said in the ruling – “In accepting the 
exchange offers of thirty cents on the dollar, the exchange bondholders bargained for 
certainty and the avoidance of the burden and risk of litigating their rights on the FAA Bonds. 
However, they knew full well that other owners of FAA Bonds were seeking to obtain full 
payment of the amounts due on such bonds through persisting in the litigation. Indeed, the 
exchange bondholders were able to watch year after year while plaintiffs in the litigation 
pursued methods of recovery against Argentina which were largely unsuccessful. However, 
decisions have now been handed down by the District Court and the Court of Appeals based 
on the Pari Passu Clause, which give promise of providing plaintiffs with full recovery of the 
amounts due to them on their FAA Bonds. This is hardly an injustice. The exchange 
bondholders made the choice not to pursue the route which plaintiffs have pursued”. This is a 
very narrow reading of the contract given the fact that the exchange bondholders did not 
choose the route of litigation because they did not have deep pockets like the hedge fund 
NML. The restructured bondholders, as I have already shown earlier, consisted of common 
people like the Argentine pension holders and the small retail investors in Italy who did not 
have the financial wherewithal to pursue litigation in US courts. Although this judgement 
might sound a narrow reading of the contract, it fits in well within the established principles 
of jurisprudence under the New York Law. In an earlier case arguing about the interpretation 
of the acceleration clause in FAA bonds in 2004, The Court of Appeals had observed that “In 
New York, a bond is a contract …. Thus the parties‟ dispute over the meaning of the Equal 
Treatment Provision presents a “simple question of contract interpretation.”.” (EM Ltd. v. 
Republic of Argentina, 382 F.3d 291,292 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
This order also had the power to impair the system of financial intermediation since the third 
parties were prohibited by this order to make payments to the restructured bondholders on 
behalf of Argentina. In the initial ruling of November 2012, only those third parties who were 
making payments to restructured bondholders with bonds issued under New York Law 
jurisdiction were included. Argentina used to make its payments to its US creditors who had 
agreed to the debt restructuring through the Bank of New York Mellon (BNY) which was the 
indenture trustee (financial intermediary). Judge Griesa observed in his ruling that “It goes 
without saying that if Argentina is able to make the payments on the Exchange Bonds 
without making the payments to plaintiffs, the District Court and Court of Appeals‟ rulings 
and the Injunctions will be entirely for naught. To avoid this, it is necessary that the process 
for making payments on the Exchange Bonds be covered by the Injunctions, and that the 
parties participating in that process be so covered” (NML Capital, LTD., v. Republic of 
Argentina, United States District Court, Southern District of New York). All through the 
litigation period, Argentina had refused to bow down to the pressures of the US courts and 
make payments to the holdouts. The government of Argentina was under the expectation that 
it would finally win the case in an upper level court in the US because it thought that these 
interpretations of the district court were violations of the sovereign immunity which 
Argentina enjoyed. Even after the BNY was barred from making payments to Argentina‟s US 
creditors, the government of Argentina held its fort and decided to focus on other sources of 
finance since the country anyway had lost access to international capital markets after the 
December 2001 default. The country started issuing more bonds under the Argentine 
jurisdiction so as to have a less volatile source of financing at hand. This attempt by the 
Argentine government to save itself from the judgements of the US courts (by not making 
payments to the holdouts) and still keep itself current on its payment commitments got a 
death blow after it lost its case in the US Supreme Court in June 2014. The US Supreme court 
denied a writ of certiorari
2
 and denied Argentina‟s claim that the judgement transgressed 
sovereign immunity. FSIA (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act) 1976 had already weakened 
such immunity. There are two kinds of sovereign immunity- “jurisdictional” and “execution”. 
The court held that “The first, jurisdictional immunity was waived here. The second, 
execution immunity, generally shields “property in the United States of a foreign state” from 
attachment, arrest and execution. The Act
3
 has no third provision forbidding or limiting 
discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor‟s assets” (Republic of 
Argentina v. NML Capital , Ltd. ,Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, Supreme Court of the United States). This vindicated the stand of the US 
district court and it was now ready to cross every jurisdiction to make sure that its orders are 
held. Since Argentina was adamant that it would not pay the „vulture funds‟, Citibank which 
is into custody business for dollar denominated bonds issued under the Argentine jurisdiction 
was asked to stop making payments to the restructured bondholders by Judge Griesa on July 
28
th
 2014. This led Argentina to another default on payments due on 30
th
 July 2014 since it 
could not violate the RUFO clause and the hands of the financial intermediary Citibank were 
tied by the court‟s orders. Citibank appealed again in the district court requesting that it be 
allowed to resume its duties (that of an intermediary) citing sanction by Argentine 
government as the reason. To this, Judge Griesa replied in another judgment on 12
th
 March 
2015 that “By observing the injunction, Citibank asserts that it risks sanction in Argentina. 
However, if Citibank processes payments on exchange bonds, it violates the Injunction issued 
by this court. Neither option is appealing. But if Citibank‟s predicament is a matter of comity, 
it is only because the Republic has refused to observe the judgments of the court to whose 
jurisdiction it acceded. Comity does not suggest abrogating those judgments, or creating 
exceptions to the Injunction designed to enforce them. Rather, comity suggests that the 
Republic not penalize third parties, like Citibank, who must observe the orders of United 
States courts” (NML CAPITAL, LTD. v. THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, United States 
District Court, Southern District of New York; 12
th
 March 2015). Argentina had explored the 
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 A writ seeking judicial review. 
3
 The Act here refers to the FSIA, 1976. 
possibility of issuing bonds to its restructured bondholders in its own jurisdiction but the 
“original sin” problem had played its role. Although the bonds were issued under the 
Argentine jurisdiction, the currency denomination of most of the bonds remained US dollars 
and the US court decision made full use of this lacuna to hold Argentina accountable in this 
case. Between June and October 2015, Judge Griesa granted the “ME TOO” injunctions to 49 
more plaintiffs so that even they could seek legal aid under the “pari passu” clause (Rule 
62.1 Indicative Ruling, S.D.N.Y., February 2016). The change of government in Argentina in 
December 2015 vindicated the stand of the US courts even further because the new 
government under the stewardship of Mauricio Macri settled with the holdouts. The 
injunction which was applied in 2012 was removed by Judge Griesa and Argentina is now 
free to pay everybody including the holdouts. The Argentine Congress has also ratified the 
proposal in the end of March 2016 and in the first round, Argentina has agreed to settle with 
four of the “holdouts” for the following sums as shown by the graph below. The important 
point here is that these holdouts had not even bought these securities at their original face 
values. They had hedged and bought the securities at deep discounts – NML for example, had 
bought the bonds at around 177 million $ and were now asking for full face value, full past 
due interest and also legal fees which they had to incur during the litigation process. Graph 
1.4 shows the compensation on principal which the 4 holdouts with whom the Republic of 
Argentina has agreed to settle would receive –  
Graph 1.4: Argentina’s Settlement with the Holdout Creditors 
Source: Data filed in the court on 29
th
 Feb 2016 by the Under Secretary of Finance, 
Argentina. All figures are in US million $. 
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This settlement of Argentina with the „vulture funds‟4 which bought its debt at heavily 
discounted prices and are now being paid in full the face value of their bonds has brought the 
idea of sovereign debt restructuring in “good faith” (Brookings report on Revisiting 
Sovereign Bankruptcy, 2013)  under serious threat. This agreement with the hedge funds has 
set a very wrong precedent for restructuring attempts in the future. It would be extremely 
difficult to have a binding agreement with the creditors who were ready before this episode to 
renegotiate their contracts in “good faith” with the sovereign debtor unlike the holdouts 
(which includes hedge funds who buy emerging market debt for speculative purposes). The 
idea of collective action clauses (CAC‟s) will take a beating in the future. The most important 
fallout of this deal in Argentina for economic theory is the following - Sovereign debt no 
more remains unenforceable; creditors can force a sovereign debtor to pay off its debts. 
The most important assumption of the theoretical models of the 1980‟s stands shaken to the 
core. 
1.4: Looking Back: Was History Any Better? 
It is instructive to look back at history and see whether it has some lessons to offer. I am 
looking at the terms on which Argentine debt was restructured after the Barings‟ crisis of 
1890. This way of looking at history is not entirely novel. Economists have drawn an analogy 
between the Barings‟ crisis and the tequila crisis of 1995 (Eichengreen, 1999). Some have 
also looked at quantitative easing in the US through the “prism of the Barings‟ crisis” 
(Vasudevan, 2014). But the comparison of the debt restructuring “then” and “now” for 
Argentina has hitherto remained unexplored although the Barings episode in general has been 
looked at before (Fishlow in Eichengreen and Lindert, 1989). Latin American countries in 
general have had a long association with the international capital markets dating back to the 
Gold Standard era when the capital markets were as thriving as they were in the 1990‟s. 
Argentina saw a similar wave of liquidity flowing in the 1880‟s as it saw in the 1990‟s. There 
were striking similarities between these two decades separated by a century. There were low 
interest rates prevailing in the core
5
 in the 1880‟s and the early 1990‟s which facilitated huge 
capital inflows into the periphery Argentina. During both of these decades, Argentinian 
economy was working on more or less fixed exchange rate systems (the gold standard from 
the early 1880‟s and the convertibility programme from 1991) and the “euphoria” 
                                                          
4
 A term used by Former Argentine President Cristina Kirchner to refer to the hedge funds who refused to 
participate in the restructuring process. 
5
 Britain constituted the core in the 1880‟s while the fulcrum shifted to the United States after the Great 
Depression. 
(Kindleberger, 1978) in both was succeeded by “sudden stop” (Dornbusch, Goldfajn and 
Valdes, 1995). 
 The Baring Brothers (richest merchant bankers of the time in Britain) had invested heavily in 
Argentina in the 1880‟s and the shock came in 1888 when Barings failed to float a bond 
(Buenos Aires Drainage and Waterworks Company bond). Argentina was unable to pay and 
its GDP fell by 11 % between 1890 and 1891. Like the Lehman Brothers case, the “too big to 
fail” theory was put forth to save the Barings‟ Brothers. This was unusual since governments 
in the gold standard era had an “ambivalent attitude” towards intervention in the creditor-
debtor negotiations. Some economists in the past have also argued that lesser intervention by 
the governments and national banks were the reason for the default clusters in the late 19
th
 
century (Eichengreen and Portes in Eichengreen and Lindert, 1989). Although intervention to 
save Barings‟ brothers was an exception rather than a rule in those times, the case itself is 
interesting to explore for its ramifications. The liquidation of the Baring brothers required 
that its assets be in a “marketable” state and since most of its assets were Argentine 
securities, the panacea to the Barings‟ crisis was a recovery of the Argentine economy so that 
repayment on its debt could start again. A committee was set up under Lord Rothschild who 
was also a merchant banker in England to suggest solutions for Argentina‟s debt overhang. 
The committee thought of three solutions – 
1. Argentina should go for structural reforms and no finance should be extended till the 
time serious reforms have started. 
2. Argentina should be pressurised for clearing its dues towards its creditors but at the 
same time, some sources of external finance should be kept open for the country. 
3. A funding loan which is commensurate to Argentina‟s needs should be advanced to 
the country and the policy reforms should be pushed in the long term (Fishlow in 
Eichengreen and Lindert, 1989). 
The first two solutions seen retrospectively from the vantage point of today seem to be two 
variants of austerity though with difference of degree. The first solution cited above is the 
harsher version of austerity while the second one is more like the Lending-in-Arrears policy 
of the IMF which envisages structural reforms in the future as the cost of emergency funding. 
It is heartening to note that the committee chose the third option and Argentina was lent 
money without being coaxed for immediate reforms in exchange. What followed next is even 
more surprising given the generally assumed antagonistic nature of the relationship between 
the debtor and the creditor. The loan which was approved by the Rothschild Committee failed 
to improve situations much since the amount extended could cover only about a third of 
foreign exchange requirements for full debt service. Due to the failure of the above plan, a 
debt restructuring deal (The Arreglo Romero) was worked out in 1893 which had the 
following suggestions – 
1. “For 5 years till 1898, interest payments were to be reduced by an average of 30 
per cent. 
2. Amortisation6 was to be suspended until the beginning of 1901.” (Fishlow in 
Eichengreen and Portes, 1989). 
Creditors acceded to this demand and the Argentine economy saw a large influx of capital 
post restructuring – between 1901 and 1915, 47% of gross fixed investment was foreign 
financed (Diaz-Alejandro,1970). 
I now shift my focus to the inter-war period
7
 when major geo-political and institutional 
changes pertaining to sovereign debt renegotiations had taken place. After the First World 
War, US became the new centre of global finance after achieving a net creditor status. The 
role of US in deciding the direction of global capital flows became entrenched by the end of 
the Second World War. The US had used “gunboat diplomacy” to establish its supremacy at 
the dawn of the 20
th
 century; by the time of the Great Depression it turned to the carrot policy 
of “dollar diplomacy”. The major institutional change which had taken place is that creditor 
country governments had now started intervening in the creditor-debtor relationship on behalf 
of their creditors, though the extent was still small when compared to their actions today. 
Argentina was a “poster child” even during the inter-war period since it remained current on 
its repayment obligations while other sovereign debtors in its neighbourhood like Bolivia, 
Colombia, Chile and Peru around the same time had reneged on their payment commitments 
to their creditors. This can be seen clearly from the historical data which I have shown in 
Table 1.2 – 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Repayment of prinicipal loan. 
7
 The period between the two world wars. 
Table 1.2: Sovereign Borrowings and Repayments during the Inter-War period 
Source: Jorgenson and Sachs in Eichengreen and Lindert, 1989. The above figures are for the 
inter-war period and are discounted for 1920 year-end. 
The present value ratio is the ratio of repayments to borrowings and as the above table shows, 
Argentina was the only country which was a faithful debtor in the region. All other countries 
considered here were “defaulters” during the inter-war period (Jorgenson and Sachs in 
Eichengreen and Lindert, 1989). There were economists who developed utility models on 
willingness to pay and one of their major assumptions in their models was that countries 
would pay because of the fear of “loss of reputation” (Eaton, 1981; Eaton, Gersowitz and 
Stiglitz, 1986). The evidence from Argentina from the inter-war period poses a serious threat 
to this assumption in their models. Although Argentina was a faithful debtor and conducted 
its negotiations in “good faith” with its creditors, it did not receive any prizes for preserving 
its “reputation” (Table 1.3) –  
Table 1.3: 15-year averages of the ratio of external finance to exports 
15 year averages of 
ratios of the following  
to exports for the 
period 1950-64 
Govt. Private Official Transfers Total (including 
direct investment) 
Argentina -0.473 5.0085 0.0431 9.1614 
Bolivia 1.6654 2.8509 22.046 36.502 
Chile 4.0817 2.7391 1.8566 13.792 
Colombia 2.4770 3.7858 0.5367 8.0554 
Peru 1.4958 5.9489 1.0589 15.685 
Source: Jorgensen and Sachs in Eichengreen and Lindert, 1989.  
1920 Total Borrowings (million 
US $) 
Total Repayments (million 
US $) 
Present value ratio   
Argentina 258.59 323.12 1.25 
Bolivia 49.13 26.32 0.54 
Chile 178.12 99.25 0.56 
Colombia 46.59 39.74 0.85 
Peru 54.45 28.08 0.52 
Table 1.3 shows 15-year averages of the ratio of external finance (flowing through various 
sectors mentioned in the columns) to the exports of the countries for the period 1950-64. It 
explains the fact that after the effects of the Great Depression had started waning and the 
international lending exercise picked up post World War II, Argentina performed worse in 
attracting capital inflows compared to countries in its neighbourhood which were serial 
defaulters in the inter-war period. As far as inflows through official transfers in the post-war 
period are concerned, it was the worst performer; all countries in the region which are 
considered here were shown more generosity by official lenders. This can be seen from the 
above table as the “defaulters” have a higher ratio of official transfers to their exports than 
Argentina. 
The lesson one learns from the historical experiences cited above is quite clear – though there 
can be no denial of the fact that the relationship between the debtor and the creditor is always 
antagonistic, there were possibilities by which the debt negotiation solution could be made 
amicable. What one observes is a gradual worsening of the policy alternatives available to a 
sovereign debtor who wants to show “willingness to pay” but not at the cost of starving its 
people. During the gold standard era, the intervention by the Central Bank of England on the 
part of Barings‟ Brothers was a rare instance. Creditor country governments would not resort 
to such intervention on the behalf of their creditors on a routine basis. And even after the 
intervention in the Barings‟ case, the solution was in the interests of the sovereign debtor. 
This got worse in the “dollar diplomacy” days of the inter-war period when interventions in 
the private creditor- sovereign debtor relation became contingent on the foreign policy of the 
major creditor nation of the world and the new linchpin of global finance – the United States. 
But even those days look brighter from the vantage point of today when the methods to 
protect the interests of the financial bourgeoisie have become „systemic‟; when the courts 
have crossed their jurisdictions to protect the hedge funds in the contemporary global 
economy. The worsening possibilities for a negotiation between the sovereign debtor and its 
creditors can have serious repercussions. The Arreglo Romero in 1890‟s was partly a result of 
the humiliation which Argentines faced at the hands of the Rothschild Committee and the 
Bank of England (when lesser funding was advanced to Argentina); the Peronist movement 
which came up in the early 1950‟s was in part a xenophobic backlash against the “continued 
debt servicing” by Argentina in the inter-war period (Jorgenson and Sachs in Eichengreen 
and Lindert, 1989) – time is ripe for another xenophobia after the government of Argentina 
succumbs to Judge Griesa‟s orders. There are protests on the streets of Buenos Aires. The 
idea that repayment by the debtor is sacred would take a heavy toll on human lives. History, 
if anything, seems to be a translucent mirror. It has both good and bad lessons on offer but 
unfortunately only the bad lessons are able to peep through the passage of time and that too, 
with greater ferocity in the era of new imperialism. 
1.5: Lessons for Other Developing Countries from This Episode 
There are two important lessons on offer from the study of the Argentine case. The first one 
pertains to the factors leading to the onset of the crisis and the second relates to the crisis 
resolution strategies that Argentina employed.  Argentina implemented a macroeconomic 
programme in the early 1990s that used fixed exchange rates as a nominal anchor to the 
runaway inflation in the economy. The commitment to this hard currency peg became 
difficult later because of the following logic - the capital inflows led to an overvaluation of 
the currency making the tradable goods sector less competitive on the world market. The 
worsened export capacity of the country led to a deterioration of the current account balance, 
which, in turn, led to an increased requirement for external financing. This increase in the 
external borrowing then raised concerns about the ability of the government to hold on to the 
fixed exchange rate regime. The rise in the country risk invited speculative attacks against the 
domestic currency and triggered a flight to other currencies like the US dollar (Frenkel and 
Rapetti, 2014). The banking and currency crisis that followed made it difficult for Argentina 
to service its debt burden and it eventually defaulted in 2001. The mechanism described 
above suggests that there are many imperfections that operate in the international capital 
markets and that the developing countries cannot be dependent on foreign capital inflows for 
their economic sustenance. So, a policy focussed only on price stabilisation and one that does 
not take into account the losses suffered by the tradable goods sector of the economy due to 
overvaluation of the currency might not be sustainable in the future. Developing countries 
need to maintain a stable and competitive real exchange rate to enjoy the benefits of opening 
up their economies. Many recent studies have shown that undervalued real exchange rates 
lead to stable long-term growth by keeping a check on the external debt accumulation and 
hence the case of “sudden stops” of capital flows to the economy is avoided (Prasad et al., 
2007). 
The second important lesson that the developing countries can learn from the Argentinean 
story is related to the crisis resolution strategies. Although the government of Argentina went 
in for bilateral debt renegotiations with its creditors in “good faith” without involving the 
IMF, it still could not be successful in its attempt to restructure its debt burden. Although 
92% of the creditors accepted the debt swap that took place twice in 2005 and 2010, some 
holdout creditors wrecked this deal having won the litigation in the US courts. This deal with 
the holdout creditors does not bode well for the sovereign debt contracts that are still under 
the jurisdiction of the US courts. The original sin problem was that “Countries cannot borrow 
abroad in their own currency” (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 1999; 2003). This 
problem has now gone worse after the judgement given by Judge Griesa in which he 
narrowly read the “pari passu” clause. Even if 1% of the sovereign debt of a developing 
country is issued in a developed country jurisdiction like the US, it has the threat of foiling 
the restructuring deal that might have been accepted by the other 99% creditors (with whom 
the debt contract is not signed in the US jurisdiction). Sovereign debt was considered 
unenforceable in the literature before the Argentina episode happened. The idea was that 
sovereign debtors cannot be forced to repay by their creditors by legal means. The threat now 
for other developing countries that have issued sovereign debt under the US jurisdiction is 
that sovereign debt might not be unenforceable anymore. They can be dragged to courts in 
the US if the holdout creditors wish to do so and the developing country debtors might end up 
paying the full amount due to the holdout creditors. As the historical evidence presented in 
this chapter shows, the global financial architecture has gradually worsened over time as far 
as the treatment of debtors in any sovereign debt contract is concerned. 
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